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Predicting future war and warfare is as daunting a task as the issue of forecasting world politics. Paul 
Hirst (2002: 90) argued that: “Predicting the future of war is a risky business. The key thing to avoid 
is over generalisation from current events.” Hans Morgenthau (1985: 23) even claimed that: “The 
first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities 
of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible. Here the 
scholar and the charlatan part company.” Another well known and respected American social 
scientist, Robert Jervis (1992), once stressed that the basic problem for us is that phenomena such as 
wars tend to be multi-causal and, since predictions usually rely on extrapolating from one variable, 
predictions are inherently difficult in world politics. A second problem for forecasting is that 
humans may actually learn things. If they do, they can, of course, avoid repeating past mistakes; but, 
as they do so, they inadvertently make predictions even trickier. John Lewis Gaddis (2004: 11) has 
argued that the true worth of history is “to prepare you for the future by expanding experience, so 
that you can increase your skills, your stamina—and, if all goes well, your wisdom.”  
In general, it is fruitful to distinguish between different approaches to the study of the future and the 
role of the future for current policy processes. The first approach develops scenarios for the future. 
It can be said to premier current policy considerations over necessarily predicting the future as such. 
Typically, government long-term planning focuses on this approach, since it provides clear-cut 
alternatives that the state needs to factor in and, in worst-case scenarios, try to avoid or manage. 
This approach can often be criticised for overstating the importance of present policy concerns in 
predicting the future. Moreover, scenarios are quite often detached from the current situation, thus 
creating the impression of lack of agency. The second approach attempts to predict the future as 
correctly as possible, and these predictions then serve as a basis for current policy options. Within 
this approach, current trends are usually thought to have an important role insofar as they serve as 
the baseline from which to extrapolate the future. Often, structural features such as conflict patterns, 
demography, and long-term economic trends are used within this approach. It, too, can be criticised 
for understating the importance of agency in shaping the future. Still, by being grounded in 
systematic data, it provides a compelling case for telling us something about the future.  
In this paper, I will develop a slightly different approach that instead assumes that the future is path-
dependent. This approach allows for a greater impact of agency and can be easily summed up as 
what happens in 2030 depends upon what we do in 2029, and what happens in 2029 depends upon 
what we do in 2028, and so on. Agency thus becomes crucial for shaping the future. Moreover, 
rather than focusing on actions, in this paper, I will primarily focus on norms. Norms change only 
gradually and slowly and are therefore a more promising baseline than current actions. Specifically, I 
will focus on norms of political order: about what it means to govern and be governed, how we 
understand the relationship between the public and private, and the concepts of civil and military.  
This paper is structured as follows. First, I will briefly discuss current patterns in war and warfare to 
evaluate whether or not there are trends that can be discerned. This part of the paper is based on the 
second approach and it serves a springboard to begin to think differently about the future. 
Throughout the paper, I will use the trends as a point of departure. Second, I will begin with a 
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 discussion on what we already know about the future. In doing so, I will critically engage with the 
NIC documents Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World and Tomorrow’s Security Challenges: The Defence 
Implications of Emerging Global Trends. In short, my critique will stress the lack of attention given to 
ideational factors. Third, and finally, I will suggest ideationally driven scenarios and identify the 
challenges to such a development of war and warfare.  
 
What we know of the recent past 
There are a number of different data sets on armed conflict. To possibly identify some current 
trends, I consulted Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP). This source has recorded ongoing 
violent conflicts since the 1970s and tracks conflicts back to the Second World War. Its definition of 
armed conflict is becoming a standard in how conflicts are systematically defined and studied. Its 
data is used in research published worldwide and in many top journals. Every year its updated data is 
published in Journal of Peace Research, as well as in a separate research report identifying trends in 
armed conflicts.  
There are a number of visible trends in the data that most likely is interesting for ten to 20 years into 
the future. First, the number of conflicts nearly doubled in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This 
number peaked in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, but then slowly receded down to a 
1980s level where it seemingly has stabilized. Second, it is, in particular, armed conflicts in the 
developing world—in Africa and Asia, specifically—that can account for the rise of armed conflict 
in the 1970s and 1980s (figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Armed Conflicts by Region, 1946–2009 
 
 
Third, it is clear that intrastate armed conflicts have been a major problem since the early 1960s, and 
this trend is reinforced throughout the following decades. The one category that starts to challenge 
this picture is internationalized armed conflicts, but they are still just a minor part of the total 
number of armed conflicts. We can also see that traditional interstate armed conflict is something 
that has been remarkably uncommon during the whole era (figure 2).  
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Fourth, contrary to popular wisdom that holds that ethnicity-based and secessionist wars have been 
the major problem for international security since the Cold War, it is primarily conflicts regarding 
governance that have increased since the 1970s, while the number of ethnicity-based and 
secessionist armed conflicts have remained more or less stable since the mid-1960s (figure 3).  
 




Finally, the data confirm the well-known tendency that armed conflicts do not escalate very often 
into wars, large-scale organised violence. The number of on-going wars throughout this period has 
roughly been 5-10 per year. The increase from the 1970s and onwards in armed conflicts instead can 
be attributed to an increase in minor armed conflicts (figure 4). Armed conflict is defined by UCDP 
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 as “… a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of 
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths.” War is defined as involving “At least 1,000 battle-related deaths in 
one calendar year.” 
 




Following from this, one could argue that typical armed conflicts in the future will be of fairly low 
intensity, occur in the developing world, mainly be intrastate, and are most likely to be about the 
governance of a state. One of the problems, however, with trying to project these trends, even into 
the near future of coming decades, is that we need to figure out how to explain these trends. If we 
cannot, then we cannot be sure that we are projecting the right trends. It is also difficult for data-
collection forecasts to account for sudden disruptions and discontinuities. This challenge is 
appropriately recognised in Global Trends 2025. The end of the Cold War and its consequences are 
cases in point. To try to figure out the future, it may be necessary to use a different approach. 
 
What we already know about the future 
My starting point for this discussion is that predicting the future may not be a problem. It is my 
contention that we know the medium-term future of war and warfare pretty well already. We know it 
already. This may sound rather alarming at first, but two important conditions underpin this claim.  
First, if you believe in the importance of ideational factors, i.e., if you are in any shape or form a 
little bit constructivist, you will recognise that we cannot fight wars and conduct strategy or 
operations in a way we have not thought about beforehand. A number of scholars have recognised 
the impact of culture and mental frameworks on the conduct of operations (e.g. Farrell 2005; van 
Creveld 2009). Hence, a precondition for action is our images of war. Our planning and plans for 
war are, therefore, important roadmaps. Our categories of warfare will influence how we conduct 
our operations in the future. In this case, two sets of norms are critical.  
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 Following Katzenstein (1996), we can differentiate between constitutive norms and prescriptive 
norms. The former refers to a set of norms regarding our identity, while the latter refers to a set of 
norms encouraging or discouraging certain behaviour. Following this logic, we can talk of certain 
prevailing values in the West today that make us who we are and what we deem acceptable military 
behaviour to reach policy ends. For instance, in the Kosovar village of Caglavica in 2004, Swedish 
soldiers took a beating for more than 12 hours with sticks, bottles, and stones thrown at them, but 
they did not open fire. Neither did they, despite having the capacity to do so, attack the villagers 
during the night using their superior night vision capability as a force multiplier. Change century to 
the Thirty Years’ War. Again with Swedish forces fighting on the European continent, there are 
hardly any doubts that Swedish units committed what we now would consider atrocities.  
One could also argue that current soldier ethos—and what military sociologist Anthony King has 
called “infanterisation of war”—are problems for Western counter-insurgency efforts. Is part of the 
problem for the West that we are trained for and our doctrines are written for a war on the Soviet 
Union in Central Europe? Can we have a truly “adaptive mindset,” or do we need to choose our 
images of war? Regardless, these arguments suggest that since there is inertia in our minds of what 
war will look like; all we have to do is investigate the outcome of the work of groups such as 
ourselves. The categories, operation types, and strategies that we come up with are the ones we can 
expect to be pursued and conducted in the medium-term future. In short, since we will fight the 
wars we can imagine, we can already now understand how wars will look in 20 years.  
Second, even if you are not a constructivist, you can still reach the conclusion that we already know 
what wars will look like in the medium-term future. The reason, from a rationalist point of view, 
would be to stress partly the plans and planning that are conducted in military staffs and 
headquarters around the globe. The planning exercises that take place and are contrived in military 
colleges are also part of this and are influenced in part by the long life cycle of today’s advanced 
military hardware. For instance, we know that Sweden will not wage nuclear war even in 20 years’ 
time. It simply does not have the know-how and technological capabilities to build the warheads and 
missiles needed to wage nuclear war. It is not uncommon to talk of advanced weapon systems 
having a life cycle of 30 to 40 years from development to retirement. Whatever capabilities we now 
have or are developing will be the capabilities that we have at our disposal in the medium-term 
future. This line of reasoning also points to the fact that we already know quite a bit about future 
war.  
There are, however, two important problems with this approach. First, as Clausewitz reminds us, 
war, we control the dynamics equally as much as our opponent does. Thus, even if we assume that 
our mental frameworks rule our behaviour, the opponent is likely to differ in terms of how the war 
should be conducted. This interaction is inherent in war. In that interchange of strategies, there are 
bound to be surprises and processes of learning, adapting, and copying (Horowitz 2010). It also 
follows that our opponent may create different military capabilities that can counter ours. We, thus, 
cannot be completely sure that actual war in the future will follow exactly how we currently think 
and prepare for war. Elsewhere, I (2011) have differentiated between four types of asymmetric 
conflicts: configurative, power, organizational, and norms. Perhaps the most challenging of these 
will be asymmetry in norms, which this paper will address in the following section.  
Second, even if the argument that how we prepare, plan, and think today reflects how we will do so 
in the future was a perfect match, it does not really help us a great deal in limiting the alternatives. 
Typically, long-term defense planning attempts to cover all conceivable bases when describing future 
war. For example, the document at hand includes conflict categories and scenarios such as great-
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 40
Angstrom Ideas and Norms in Future War and Warfare 
 power war, small-power war, and non-state war; we also consider potential conflict scenarios as 
nuclear wars, conventional wars, and asymmetric wars. This vast range usually makes it very difficult 
and impractical to establish priorities. On the one hand, for instance, Sweden may feel constrained 
by its limited resources and thus tough priorities are needed. The US military with considerably more 
resources may not need to set such priorities; but, on the other hand, perhaps increased guidance 
and priorities are exactly what is needed in the US context, too. Note, however, that this is not 
necessarily a major criticism of the two NIC documents. I think they are strong, seem thought-
through, and make a very convincing case in futurology for the scenarios.  
The one major bit of criticism, though, that can be levelled against the documents is that they 
underplay the role of ideas and norms in strategic decisions, such as what military capabilities a state 
acquires, when it goes to war, and how it conducts war. Neither of the documents, moreover, 
question fundamental features of the political order today.  
 
Notions of political order and their impact on war and warfare 
Following Kalevi Holsti (1996), my starting point in this argument is that our ideas of political order 
have an impact on three things: 1) how we institutionalise large-scale violence, i.e., the organizations 
that we create to conduct war; 2) for what purposes we conduct wars; and 3) how we conduct war. 
In the following, I will outline this logic and, derived from three-tiered global political order, identify 
three challenges that are not only bothersome but that are also most-likely scenarios for the West. A 
main conclusion from this may be that we create problems for ourselves.  
Modern archaeologists of humankind now know that rather than a serial evolution from 
Neanderthals to Homo sapiens where one species replaced the other these two species co-existed 
for thousands of years with interbreeding taking place. It is logical that other forms of interaction 
took place, as well, including conflict and competition for food, resources, and housing. I claim is 
that we, too, now live in a period of change in human history and fundamental transition in human 
social and political order. War and conflict are inherent parts of these orders. But war plays different 
roles in these processes. It is creator, destroyer, and maintainer. Types of war and conflict will 
therefore co-exist. It will not be a time of only interstate war or only intrastate (or extra-state) war; it 
will be a transition period where both types of war and conflict will exist at the same time. This is 
not the first time such a set of competing forms of political order have existed. Hendrik Spruyt 
(1994) has demonstrated that in late Medieval Europe, emerging territorial sovereign states co-
existed with city-states and empires, as well as overlapping authorities of the Church, world leaders, 
and feudal princes. Rivalry between economic and political systems ensued. It took, arguably, several 
hundred years of wars and unrest to settle the European state system.  
Today, three major forms of political order co-exist (Cooper 2003). Within each political regime (or 
system of thinking), the various actors share similar interpretations for the concepts of power, 
justice, war, violence, peace, victory, and the relationship between private and public. Between the 
different forms of political order there is not a shared understanding of these key concepts. First, we 
have what we can call pre-Westphalian political order. We find this most often in the developing 
world; indeed, the lack of a Western version of statehood is a well-known problem among scholars 
interested in the developing world. My Western understanding of the pre-Westphalian system 
shares, for example, many similarities with what Jackson (1990) termed “quasi-states. In a way, these 
are political systems that never went through the internal processes of state-building and instead 
have experienced a mixture of external “life-support” and “too tight embraces”—to use Astri 
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 Suhrke’s (2010) words—from an “invited Leviathan” (Angstrom 2008). Note that the lack of a 
strong Westphalian state system does not imply that there is chaos. Quite a few studies have instead 
demonstrated the quite remarkable longevity and stability of this pre-Westphalian order. Not only 
has it proven successful in terms of survival, but some individuals and collective actors can thrive 
and prosper within the order. Still, weak statehood also means that there are alternative levels of 
identity formation. Clans, families, and ethnic groups remain viable alternatives to the state. 
Second, we have a remaining Westphalian political order. In East Asia, parts of Latin America, and 
Central and Eastern Europe, the Westphalian state order remains strong and vital. Paradoxically, the 
wars that broke up Yugoslavia strengthened the state system in that region. Processes of 
centralization and capital accumulation continue unchecked in these regions, and the state capitals 
are capable of extending control over territory and population to an increased degree. Processes of 
identity formation are increasingly joined with statehood. Initiation in adulthood happens with clear 
state symbols, such as the right to vote and conscription.  
Third, primarily in Western Europe and the US, globalisation, increased interstate trade, and porous 
borders are transforming the political order. This is especially so with the emergence of the modern 
European Union, something political scientists still struggle to define and conceptualise. Following 
Cooper and Sperling (2009), we can talk of an emerging post-Westphalian form of political order. 
Here, again, identities become disjointed from the state. Professional armies and the emergence of 
private security options are partly decoupling the state from security and identity.  
For the purposes of analysis, I understand war not only as an expression of agency but from 
functional perspective, as an institution within the forms of order. War will maintain the order. 
Because war is seen—from within this system—as only useable by a certain category of social actors; 
whenever war is fought, it confirms the social order. Other violence is understood to be something 
other than war. War is, therefore, central to work out differences between actors—to handle 
conflicts. And, it has been understood to be the final arbiter of these differences of opinion. Thus, 
when in doubt, use war, because, however harmful, it is the one institution that confirms the system. 
And it is one where the rules of the game—and practices of war—are more or less coherent within 
each “system of thought and values.” Within the Westphalian regime, war has been stigmatized, or 
even prohibited in various forms of international law if there was a state involved. If other actors 
engaged in organizing large-scale, politically motivated violence, it was not considered to be war, but 
a form of crime. In this way, war confirmed the existence of the state throughout the Westphalian 
system, which by the war was re-created continuously. The Westphalian order is confirmed 
continuously through a long list of institutions other than war, international intergovernmental 
organizations such as the UN, diplomacy, foreign aid, and international trade.  
Simultaneously, I suggest that war maintains the non-Westphalian systems of order, too. But, these 
have a different version of war and, consequently, a different form of social and political order is 
reproduced and maintained, one that is decentralised and small scale, with skirmishes and limited 
combat, rather than mass battles as the main kinetic interaction. This implies that there is no need 
for larger armies, which means that there are few incentives to bureaucratize and make taxation 
more efficient, which again reinforces a decentralised political order (Angstrom under review). Even 
in this kind of order, war retains political order. Here, it is not a state that is created or recreated, 
since the war between the actors in this system of thought is not carried out large-scale, but through 
small wars where skirmishes, ambushes, and looting dominate warfare. The consequence is that this 
type of war generates and regenerates a different polity on a continual basis.  
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 War, while it effectively maintains a particular form of social order, is also the major challenge for 
this particular form of order. War was a central part in creating this system, but it is also the one 
force that can unravel it, if one lets it go. And this is the second function for the rivalling social 
political order. It destroys the old system by being the major form for rivalling the existing socio-
political order. These forms of war will be fought between different systems of thought, different 
perceptions of what constitutes civilians, victory, and indeed war itself. The coming 30 years will be, 
I claim, a transition period where both types of war and conflict will exist at the same time; just as 
Neanderthals and Homo sapiens interbred, so may the types of war and conflict. And in these 
clashes, war will destroy the social and political order of one or both of the actors.  
If we understand war from a functionalistic perspective, war is also a process of emulation, learning, 
adaptation, and adjustment. This also means that war between forms of order will not only be a 
force for transformation of the actors’ political systems but also a force for transforming warfare 
itself. We have only seen this in Afghanistan so far. The war in Iraq in the 2000s was not a challenge 
to destroy things; it has confirmed the state. But the evolution in Central Asia and in the Afghan-
Pakistan border regions is the sign of things to come where these systems of thought collide.  
This form of conflict will occur between actors representing different interpretations of social and 
political order, non-Westphalian versus Westphalian. It is worth noting that this development 
cannot be equated with “the West Against the Rest” hypothesis according to a Huntingtonian 
cultural logic. First of all, conflicts will not arise between cultures, like earthquakes in the cracks 
between teutonic plates, as Huntington claimed. Already we can observe conflict between different 
factions representing nongovernmental regimes in Pakistan and Afghanistan, two states with 
essentially Westphalian orders—and these are two countries located in the same culture, according 
to Huntington. Second, Huntington’s culturalist argument is essentially pessimistic, because he 
claims that the basic cause of conflict is the diversity of cultures. Thus, because there are likely to be 
differences among people in the foreseeable future, conflicts will also continue. The earlier points 
made about different types of political order are, in contrast to Huntington, an optimistic thought. 
Since conflict is a result of different perceptions as to what is the correct interpretation of various 
concepts, we can learn to think differently. The archtypical case of a conflict under the third type of 
conflict is the conflict in southern Central Asia, which has lasted for over 30 years and involves 
globalized post-Westphalian actors, Westphalian actors, and decentralized nonstate actors. In all 
respects, this is a form of conflict where the involved parties have to change their fundamental ideas 
about key concepts, such as justice, power, and the like. If this war is a “struggle of wills,” only very 
fundamental societal transformations will constitute “victory.” 
It is equally important to note that these types of conflict are not equivalent to the dichotomy 
between the regular and irregular. There are several typical Westphalian wars and conflicts in which 
irregular warfare has been a central part of the war. In a way, it is the inclusive presence of the idea 
of a dichotomy between regular and irregular confirmation that we live in a Westphalian system. The 
word regular means literally “regular” or normal. It could be argued that the establishment of a 
dichotomy where one considered to follow the rules, while the other does not, by implication, 
suggests a normative statement about what is desirable. We are usually not, of course, arguing that it 
is good to break the rules.  
Take two poignant examples of the challenges for the Westphalian and post-Westphalian system of 
order: The separation of public and private, as well as the separation of civil and military, are inherent 
norms that made the Westphalian state possible and that also underpin the two NIC documents 
under consideration here. As keen followers of politics and conflict in the developing world will tell 
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 you, however, this separation is far from self-evident. Those knowledgeable about European history 
also will far better understand politics in Somalia or Afghanistan using the lenses of absolutist 
monarchies than through the spectacles provided by modern European states. In an essay titled 
“Nixon in Hell,” Richard N. Lebow (2003) portrays how the distinction between public and private 
is a specifically Western norm and one which evidently is not shared by many rulers in the 
developing world, where, in many cases, the revenues of state are considered to be the ruler’s private 
property. By placing this logic in a US setting with Richard Nixon, Lebow’s analysis aptly captures 
how we—as Nixon does when being tortured in Hell for things he did as holder of the office of the 
US Presidency—would struggle with a system that does not recognise the separation of public and 
private.  
We do not have to go to essayistic endeavours to illustrate how uneasy we become with actions that 
undermine the separation of public and private. The intended killing of political leaders of our 
opponents is an even clearer example, as illustrated by the different fates of Saddam Hussein and 
Osama bin Laden. US forces captured Hussein and handed him over to the Iraqi authorities for 
prosecution and later conviction and execution. Although there was some criticism, it was primarily 
levelled at the new Iraqi government for keeping the death penalty. However, in the case of Osama 
bin Laden, US soldiers seemingly were forced to kill him on the spot, rather than capturing him for a 
US court to decide his fate. Suddenly, an ethical and legal debate has emerged about the legitimacy 
of killing the political leaders of one’s opponents. While understandable, the strategic narrative of 
the West intervening in other states has for the past 20 years been one of separating the leader from 
the population by claiming that we are conducting a war against (any given leader’s name), not the 
(any given country’s) population. The consequence of this narrative is that the leader is personalized 
rather than made a holder of an office. Public office is thus turned into a private matter; the 
distinction between private and public that we want to maintain and that underpins the state is 
threatened. In stressing this newer strategic message, we undermine ourselves and our form of 
political order.  
A second example is how altering our understanding of the separation of civil and military would 
challenge and risk changing us in ways we are not necessarily comfortable with. This problem, again, 
is partly driven by our own strategies and is, therefore, a prime example of how war is a process of 
adjustment and copying. The current war in Afghanistan may not necessarily leave us in a position 
where our opponents adjust to our will; instead, we may end up copying the Taliban to a further 
extent than we originally thought. The problem is that military force has become primarily a tactical 
tool (Smith 2007; Angstrom & Duyvesteyn 2010). Because it is of tactical utility, we will struggle to 
conduct war in mixed-war contexts. If we fight an opponent who does not distinguish between 
civilian and military the way we tend to do, it will be difficult to conduct any reasonable targeting 
with kinetic or non-kinetic means. More importantly, though, the way we prepare for war makes a 
sharp distinction between civil and military and also between war and peace, where different judicial 
systems were meant to operate. This Western zone of comfort, however, is increasingly challenged 
when conducting war in the developing world. The result has been an increased focus on tactics. If 
we only kill enough, or kill the right ones, the tactical victories would be translatable into strategic 
effects.  
What if, to reach strategic ends, there is a need to adapt not only militarily, but also politically? Are 
we prepared to weaken the distinction between civil and military, upon which so much of our 
political and legal frameworks hinge? Traditionally, civilian in the Western context has meant an 
individual that is not a member of a militia or the armed forces. If we face an opponent who does 
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 not understand civilian in this way—instead using “part-timers,” for instance—our forces will 
struggle to identify proper targets and question whom to protect.  
Recasting the distinction and contents of the dichotomy between civilian and military presents three 
bad options. First, recasting civilians to be exposed as a state is hugely controversial. It would, for 
example, entail that the West adapts to the pre-Westphalian system. It would, for example, imply 
treating development aid in strategic rather than altruistic sense. If we compromise our belief 
systems, one can even start to discuss whether or not we have already lost the war.  
A second unfavorable option is to change what we mean by peace and war. The two options are, of 
course, interrelated, since we do not normally associate killing civilians with war. Critically, however, 
it may be necessary to stop making a sharp distinction between war and peace. This is troubling, 
since it would undermine international law and quite a few national laws as well, but it also has some 
promise. If we return to an understanding of organized violence as an arbiter and a constant 
presence, we may be better off fighting today’s types of wars. This is tempting, since it would 
reinforce and be in accordance with the fact that force has tactical utility. However, another 
drawback is that this would effectively leave strategy out of the war. If we do not have a political end 
in mind for the war, we would never be able to tell whether or not we won, we would not be able to 
hold our leadership accountable, and we would not be able to separate war from peace. Again, 
would not such a development imply that we have adapted to the will of our opponent?  
The third bad option would be to force the opponent to adapt to our understanding of order and 
war. As soon as that would happen, the West’s superior technology, superior firepower, and 
capabilities for large-scale warfare and integrating the branches would overpower the sometimes-
ragged local actors. The problem is that it is also clear to our opponents that playing the game 
according to the West’s standards is not an option; doing so would imply suicide to fight the West 
according to the West’s way of doing and thinking strategy. Moreover, we can hardly accredit the 
Taliban, al-Qaeda or other militants for not being guile, cleaver, and skillful.  
A third example is directly driven by globalisation. Because of modern communications, we have 
near-worldwide instant exchange of ideas and spread of ideas. Images and information of living 
standards, role models, and political ideas can spread quickly and more or less freely. Egyptian 
authorities tried to shut down social media and computer networks in an attempt to stop the 
demonstrations in central Cairo. They blocked Twitter, Facebook and other social-media sites, but 
the demonstrators maintained contact with each other and spread information through dating 
agencies and dating chat rooms that were still open. “Let’s meet at Tahir for a kiss at seven,” 
suddenly had a new—and for the Egyptian authorities—threatening meaning. The spread of ideas is 
not necessarily a problem in and of itself, but widespread access to information so far seems to have 
generated a sense of entitlement, not duty.  
If we step back in history for a short while, we can witness how European kings maintained social 
and political order by granting royal privileges. Some were exempt from taxation, some were granted 
housing and land, and some were given the opportunity for retirement benefits, far earlier than 
modern-day pensions were established. In response, nobility, priests, free peasantry, and burgers 
paid their taxes and made arms and locals available for the king’s use. The important part of this 
exchange was that privilege was turned into a sense of duty. An important part of being an adult 
citizen gradually was interwoven with enrolling as a conscript. Far earlier, of course, the nobility 
started to pride itself, and define itself, in relation to other segments of society by allegiance, duty, 
and loyalty as the leit motif in life. It seems today that increased individualization and freedom from 
the state, i.e., a privilege, has not turned into a sense of duty among the young in many parts of the 
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 developing and developed world. Instead, images of others’ seemingly more wealthy lifestyles spread 
quickly, generating a sense of entitlement, i.e., a sense of craving more. This may appear to be a 
conservative viewpoint, but it is not meant as such. Just observing images of the wealth of many 
Western societies today does not reveal the hard work that has been put in to create that wealth. 
Nor does it reveal the extent to which the wealth of the globalized North was made possible at the 
expense of the South.  
As has been evident the last few months, the West is ambivalent toward the Arab Spring. The 
concept of democracy is deeply entrenched in our identity, so supporting the demonstrators should 
seem quite reasonable. At the same time, however, we show the same anxiety over change that was 
felt early on in the fall of 1989 when the Eastern Block crumbled. This time, voices have even been 
heard implying “stability” is even more important, since those striving for democracy this time are 
Muslim; there is a fear among some that Islamic fundamentalism will dominate in a democracy, 
rather than the tolerant traditions within Islam rising to the fore in elections. If we were to support 
the authoritarian Arabic leaders, however, what does that tell us about ourselves?  
 
Conclusions: Identifying challenges  
In this paper, I have primarily engaged with the question of what current trends in war and warfare 
will continue and strengthen over the coming decades. I have done so using three different 
approaches. First, extrapolating from recent and current trends seen in the UCDP dataset, we can 
possibly project that future armed conflicts will primarily be intrastate, relatively low-intensity affairs, 
occur in the developing world, and number around 30 to 40 annually. There will be some instances 
of interstate wars, but these will be few. Increasingly, armed conflicts will be about how states are 
governed, rather than about the make up of the state’s people and territory. This approach has some 
drawbacks, though, as discussed above. 
Second, I suggested that we already know quite a bit about future warfare through self-reflection on 
how, what, and when we plan and prepare for war as well as our current technologies of warfare. 
Based on this, we can expect that the US (not the entire West) will prepare for many types of armed 
conflict: global and regional, against great-power opponents and terrorist groups, and fought with 
weapons ranging from nuclear weapons to small arms. This approach, too, has some problems, 
most notably that armed conflicts are interactions where opponents govern your behaviour to the 
same extent that you govern theirs. Thus, deducing what future warfare will look like based on our 
planning and capabilities will only capture a glimpse of future war.  
Third, I suggest an alternative: that norms of political order will have a major influence on the 
reasons why we fight, how we fight, and how we organize for fighting. My main criticism against 
Global Trends 2025 would be that it does not sufficiently take into account such ideational factors. If 
one follows the logic of a three-tiered global political order, it is possible to outline more 
uncomfortable scenarios.  
The challenge is that we are putting ourselves in these uncomfortable positions. The current 
strategies of the West are especially ill prepared to deal with these scenarios. Problematically, the 
behaviour of the West is one of the causes of this trend. Our current behaviour strengthens the very 
same tendencies that challenge us and undermines how we understand justice, right, public, private, 
civil, military, and—indeed—also peace and war. We are adapting to our opponents’ values at the 
moment. And it is precisely because we do so that we struggle with the Arab Spring. The 
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 globalization of our values—democracy, capitalism, and freedom from oppressive leaders—creates 
among the impoverished of the developing world a sense of entitlement when given the privilege to 
govern. Not duty. And it is precisely a sense of duty that has upheld social and political order in the 
West. It made the differentiation between public and private possible—and it made a division of 
labor possible between the civilian and military realms. As these divisions erode, we may come to 
look more like our opponents. This will—quite possibly—make us more effective in war against 
them, but what will be the costs of placing such a premium on tactics?  
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